1. Introduction

On the 31st of October 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a Resolution on the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (i.e., “MINURSO”). The document was approved with 11 votes in favour, and 3 abstentions from China, Pakistan, and the Russian Federation, with Algeria not participating in the vote. Amongst its objectives, there was an extension of MINURSO for an additional year. In fact, over the last three decades, the UNSC has adopted a resolution annually to enable the activity of the peacekeeping mission operating in the contested Saharan territory. 

However, unlike previous cases, this Resolution contains other – controversial – elements. The document affirms the Security Council’s support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in conducting negotiations with the parties involved in the Western Sahara dispute, with the aim of reaching a solution to the conflict based on Morocco’s 2007 Autonomy Proposal. More specifically, the Security Council calls upon the interested parties to «engage in these discussions without preconditions, taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal, with a view to achieving a final and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara» (par. 3). 

The 2007 plan referenced in the Resolution was presented by the Kingdom of Morocco as a solution to the Western Sahara issue, taking into account the needs of the population living in the disputed territory. In accordance with the plan, the interested parties are to negotiate an agreement based on certain principles set out by Morocco, and then submit it as a referendum to the people living in Western Sahara (par. 8). 

Whilst the plan acknowledges a degree of self-government for the region – including the establishment of a local administration – it grants Morocco exclusive jurisdiction over key areas, which would ultimately consider it a sovereign entity over Western Sahara. The plan recognises Morocco the attributes related to sovereignty (flag, national anthem, and currency), national security and external relations (parr. 12-14). The plan moreover provides for a regional Parliament to be elected by the population of Western Sahara, and a Head of Government elected by the Parliament and appointed by the Moroccan King (parr. 18-21). In practice, as the proposal highlights, Western Sahara should be regarded as an autonomous region within Morocco. 

Since its proposal, the consideration of Western Sahara as a Moroccan region has faced strong opposition from the population of the disputed territory (a summary of this backlash can be found in Middle East/North Africa Report, p. 6). In a proposal submitted shortly after the Moroccan plan, the Polisario Front stated that the negotiations should include, among its guarantees, the recognition of both parties’ independence (par. 9). The same view has been reaffirmed in the recent framework of the preliminary procedure for the adoption of Resolution 2797 (2025) (Proposal of the Frente POLISARIO for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and restores regional peace and stability, par. 7).

In practice, extending Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, as implicitly suggested in Resolution 2797 (2025), appears to conflict with the position of the Polisario Front, which is the legitimate and internationally recognised representative of the Sahrawi people. Against this backdrop, the recognition of the Moroccan Plan by the Resolution is the first time in which the Security Council has effectively endorsed an extension of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, agreeing fully with Moroccan interests (as recognised by Istrefi). The endorsement of the Resolution hence transforms the process of decolonisation into an incorporation in the Moroccan state (as affirmed by Makaza-Goede). Thus, mentioning the Moroccan plan may jeopardise the Saharawi population’s right to self-determination, which has been affirmed from several years in multiple contexts (for an overview, see Pelliconi, pp. 109-137). 

In light of the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to examine Resolution 2797 (2025) in order to address the principal issues, including its compliance with the right to self-determination, which will be considered not only as a substantive norm but also as a procedural norm. To this end, the lawfulness of the Resolution will be judged using the applicable rules of interpretation. Thereafter, limitations on the Security Council’s powers arising from the UN Charter, and the characterisation of the right to self-determination as a jus cogens norm, will be considered.

The only coherent set of interpretative principles applicable to Security Council resolutions is embodied in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Orakhelashvili, p. 835). They have also been recognised by the International Court of Justice, whose case law affirmed that Articles 31 and 32 may provide guidance (Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2010, par. 94). 

2. The means of interpretation of the Resolution 2797 (2025) and the potential violation of the right to self-determination

As is well known, the interpretative rules of the Vienna Convention give primacy to the treaty text, while reflecting a compromise between objective and subjective interpretation (see Sorel and Boré Eveno, p. 808). Article 31 requires consideration of the «object and purpose», implying consideration of the parties’ intentions at the time of conclusion (as stated by Linderfalk, p. 203 et seq.; for some scholars, identifying the parties’ intention is the aim of all interpretative provisions of the Vienna Convention, see Bjorge, p. 58). These intentions must be assessed in light of the parties’ declarations and their standing in international relations.

The interpretation of the resolution thus requires consideration of both its text, and the intention of the parties. From a textual perspective, Resolution 2797 (2025) does not appear to jeopardise the right to self-determination. While recalling the 2007 Moroccan Plan, the Resolution explicitly reaffirms the right to self-determination and emphasises the need to achieve a political solution that respects the interests of the Sahrawi people. When interpreting this statement, the conceptualisation of the right to self-determination as a procedural norm, which can be exercised in multiple manners, should be taken into consideration. The latter is particularly relevant to ensure that people entitled with the right to self-determination can decide about their own future, and ensure that decisions are not taken without their participation (Klabbers, p. 203). From this perspective, and in accordance with the exercise of the right to self-determination, the Sahrawis could accept – or reject – the proposal presented by the Kingdom of Morocco, if they so desire.

If the wording of the document does not appear to compromise the right to self-determination, it is then appropriate to shift from a textual interpretation, and examine the document in light of the parties’ intentions. It is therefore necessary to take into consideration that the decisions made by the Security Council, regarding Western Sahara, are made on behalf of a group of countries. This alliance of states named Group of Friends of Western Sahara is composed of the permanent members of UNSC and Spain (which is still considered the administering power of the contested territory). Amongst these countries, the United States is the so called “penholder”, meaning, it is the State which drafts the resolutions (as described by Allen and Trinidad). 

Regarding Western Sahara, the United States have demonstrated their interest in expanding Moroccan sovereignty over the region, without considering the needs of the Sahrawis. For example, in 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump affirmed that the 2007 Moroccan plan was «the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute over the Western Sahara territory» and, that, it was necessary to recognise «Moroccan sovereignty over the entire Western Sahara territory» (Proclamation on Recognizing The Sovereignty Of The Kingdom Of Morocco Over The Western Sahara, 2020). 

Recently, other members of the Group of Friends have also agreed on the Moroccan proposal. In 2022, Spain recognised the Moroccan plan as a viable solution (as reported in the Report of the Secretary General on the situation of Western Sahara, par. 13). France then followed this position in 2024 (as reported in the Report of the Secretary General on the situation of Western Sahara, par. 7) and, finally, the United Kingdom aligned itself with the other States in 2025 (UK-Morocco Joint Communiqué: Strategic Dialogue; for a critical comment on the recent recognitions by certain states of the Moroccan plan see Soroeta Liceras, pp. 251-259).

As evident from the position of the United States – which was subsequently followed by other countries as outlined above – the underlying intentions behind the resolution are geared towards fostering the extension of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. However, considering the Saharawi peoples entitlement of the right to self-determination, treating Western Sahara as part of Morocco fails to take into account their will, as the people inhabiting the territory. In fact, as noted above, the Polisario Front has consistently opposed the proposal of integrating Western Sahara in the Moroccan Kingdom.

According to a representative of the independence movement, «the proposal is another Moroccan dilatory tactic aimed at gaining international recognition of its illegal annexation of a Non-Self-Governing Territory»; this view is consistent with the Polisario Front’s rejection of the proposal, «because any autonomy project is contrary to the principle of self-determination» (see Sidi, p. 54). The application of the 2007 Plan thus appears to function primarily as a legal justification for the annexation of the contested territory. 

3. Resolution 2797 (2025) and the Limits on the Powers of the Security Council

In consideration of the above outlined discussion, Resolution 2797 (2025) arguably fails to reflect the interests of the people of Western Sahara in an adequate manner, and therefore bears the risks of undermining their right to self-determination. On this basis, it is questionable whether the Security Council may dispose of the right to self-determination, without any limitations. In fact, Article 24 (2) of the UN Charter states that the Council «shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations». As is well-known, the right to self-determination is among the main purposes of the United Nations, as stated by Article 1(2) of the Charter.

The UN Security Council’s obligation to respect the principles and purposes of the Charter has been widely acknowledged in international legal scholarship (see Peters, p. 812 et seq.; Trahan, p. 245 et seq.; Lamb, p. 366 et seq.), and, more importantly, affirmed by international case law. In fact, the limitations of the powers of the Security Council enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations has been recognised by both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

In the Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, the ICJ affirmed that the purposes of the UNSC are broad but they do not entail an unlimited power of the Council (Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962, p. 168); the same approach has been adopted by the ICTY, which affirmed that the Council is subjected to certain limitations, stating that «neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus» (Tadic Jurisdiction, 1995, par. 28). 

Although debated, the right to self-determination has also been recognised as a jus cogens norm (the qualification as a jus cogens norm has been recently confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem, 2024, par. 233). Moreover, Article 53 of the Convention expressly states that «a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law».

Notwithstanding the application of Article 53 to UNSC resolutions has been criticised (see Martenczuk, p. 546), some have pointed out how peremptory norms move beyond the law of the treaties (as affirmed by Orakhelashvili, p. 63). This approach was also confirmed by Judge Lauterpacht, who stated that «a resolution which becomes violative of jus cogens must then become void and legally ineffective» (Dissenting opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, in Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 1993, par. 104).

From this perspective, if Resolution 2797 (2025) is interpreted as reflecting an intention of the parties to extend Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, without due consideration of the interests of the Sahrawi people, it should be considered void and ineffective. 

Before concluding that the Resolution has been approved by the UNSC in breach of a peremptory norm, it should, as far as possible, be interpreted in conformity with that norm. This conclusion stems from the principle of systemic interpretation enshrined in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and has been further supported by the work of the International Law Commission (on the use of systemic interpretation as a way to harmonise different international norms, see Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Mr. Martti Koskenniemi, “Fragmentation of international law: difficulties Arising from the diversification and expansion of international law”, 2006, p. 84 et seq.). 

Considering that the Resolution envisages as a possible solution the establishment of a «genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty», the document could, in principle, be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the respect for the right to self-determination. In other words, the effective realisation of the right to self-determination depends on the conduct of the actors involved, who may determine whether, and to what extent, the Sahrawis’ right to decide on their own future is respected. This option, however, seems unlikely to be realised, as despite the possibility of a jus cogens-conforming interpretation, its implementation would ultimately constitute a breach of that norm.

4. Conclusion

As noted above, although the text of Resolution 2797 (2025) does not directly affect the right to self-determination, the statements of the States within the Group of Friends of Western Sahara arguably indicate that the Resolution seeks to extend Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory, without adequate consideration of the local population. Consequently, the only way to safeguard the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination is to use systemic interpretation to align the resolution with this fundamental principle.

Several decades ago, Kelsen maintained that «the Charter does not provide that the decisions – except those of the International Court of Justice – in order to be enforceable must be in conformity with the law which exists at the time they are adopted» (Kelsen, p. 294). This position appears to prioritise the maintenance of peace over strict compliance with international norms, giving paramount importance to Article 24(1) of the UN Charter. To which, the latter assigns to the Security Council the «primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security». Assuming this perspective, one could argue that the right to self-determination should be balanced against the need to ensure peace and security, and that Resolution 2797 (2025) might thus be justified by the objective of ending the conflict in Western Sahara. However, the continual disregard of the affected communities’ views appears likely to foster further tensions and consequently, exacerbate the conflict.